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ABSTRACT Based on unique microdata from five Sub-Saharan African countries that contain comprehensive
information on both migrants and their households at the origin country, we investigate the effect of migrants’
education on their remittance behaviour. Our results reveal that migrants’ education has no impact on the
likelihood of sending remittances, but a positive effect on the amount of money sent, conditional on remitting. The
latter effect holds for internal migrants and migrants in non-OECD countries, while it vanishes for migrants in
OECD destination countries once characteristics of the origin household are controlled for.
1. Introduction
The so-called ‘brain drain’, or the migration of high-skilled individuals to other regions where human capital
is abundant, is a major concern for developing countries with a relatively small number of highly educated
individuals, as it represents the loss of their most talented workers (see, for example, Beine, Docquier, &
Rapoport, 2008; DiMaria & Lazarova, 2012; Djiofack, Djimeu, & Boussichas, 2013; Haque&Kim, 1995).1
In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa is of particular interest: not only is the share of high-skilled individuals in
Sub-Saharan Africa among the lowest in the world (UNESCO, 2016), but the high-skilled emigration rate
from these countries has also steadily increased since the mid-1990s (from 11% in 1995 to 16% in 2010, see
Figure 1), representing today the highest high-skilled emigration rate among all developing regions. This
evolution is amplified by the high ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled emigrants (in 2010, the low-skilled
emigration rate from Sub-Saharan Africa was 0.5%), indicating that migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are
particularly positively selected in terms of their education. The brain drain thus represents a major policy
challenge in these countries, as it involves the transfer of human capital, which is one of their scarcest
resources and a key determinant to economic growth and poverty reduction. A prominent example is the
medical brain drain (for example, the emigration of doctors and nurses), which is particularly harmful because
the number of physicians per inhabitant is extremely low in Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to a severe shortage
of health-care workers and a decline in the population’s health status (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012).2
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The most evident way through which some of the negative externalities of the brain drain can be
somewhat offset are remittances (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012; Gibson & McKenzie, 2012). Although
numerous papers investigate the determinants of migrants’ remittance patterns,3 there is still little
consensus on whether and how the education of migrants affects the likelihood and the amount of
remittances sent. Building on previous literature, we revisit this question and create a unique cross-
country dataset by combining household surveys from five Sub-Saharan African countries, which
includes detailed information on both the migrants and the households at the origin country.
Theoretically, there are several reasons why high-skilled migrants may send more or less remit-
tances than low-skilled migrants. On the one hand, high-skilled migrants may remit less because they
often come from better-off families with lower income constraints. Besides, they may have a lower
propensity to return to their origin countries, which decreases their incentives to invest in their home
community. On the other hand, more educated migrants are subject to higher wages which, according
to the altruism motive of remittances, would predict them to remit more. Also, they face lower
transaction costs because they are more likely to have access to bank accounts and other financial
services, and are less likely to be undocumented migrants. In addition, following the investment
motive, remittances may serve as a way of repayment if family members at the origin country have
funded the education of the migrant (Docquier & Rapoport, 2012; Rapoport & Docquier, 2006). It is,
thus, not clear if highly educated migrants remit more or less than less skilled migrants.
Previous empirical literature on the effect of education on remittance patterns mainly relies on
macrodata, investigating the relationship between high-skilled emigration rates and remittance inflows
at the country level. Limiting their analysis to OECD destination countries, Faini (2007), Adams
(2009), and Niimi, Özden, and Schiff (2010) conclude that the adverse impact of skilled migration
cannot be mitigated through remittances because migrant remittances are lower in countries with a
high share of high skilled emigrants. These studies, however, are subject to a potential endogeneity
bias because they only observe the aggregate amount of remittances received by each country.
However, countries differ in many other ways. For example, if poverty is a constraint to both
migration and education, poor countries might send less migrants (and thus receive fewer remittances)
and those migrants might also be less educated, creating a spurious relationship between a country’s
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Figure 1. Evolution of high-skilled migration by region.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk (2013).
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high-skilled emigration rate and the amount of remittances received. Docquier, Rapoport, and
Salomone (2012) and Le Goff and Salomone (2016) addresses this issue by using panel data on
bilateral remittances. Both studies find a positive relationship between the share of high-skilled
migrants and the amount of remittances received. Docquier et al. (2012) further show that the
destination country’s immigration policy is a key determinant of the sign and magnitude of the
relationship between high-skilled emigration rates and remittances.
As outlined by Bollard, McKenzie, Morten, and Rapoport (2011), the main disadvantage of analyses
based on macrodata is that they are only able to identify whether countries that send a larger share of
educated migrants receive larger or smaller remittance flows than countries sending a smaller share of
high-skilled migrants. Microdata, on the other hand, allows a direct investigation of the relationship
between migrants’ education and their remittance behaviour. Furthermore, it has the advantage of
capturing remittances sent through both formal and informal channels. Empirical evidence based on
microdata, however, is still scarce and the results are inconclusive.
Dustmann and Mestres (2010) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and find a negative
effect of years of schooling on remittances after controlling for return intentions and for whether family
members (spouse and children) still live in the origin country. Bollard et al. (2011), on the other hand, using
a pooled dataset of household surveys in 11 OECD destination countries, find a mixed relationship
between migrants’ education and remittances. While they do not find a significant effect of having a
university degree on the likelihood of sending remittances, they find a strong positive relationship between
education and the amount of money sent, conditional on sending remittances. Using the same database but
focusing on African migrants, Bollard, McKenzie, and Morten (2010) come to a similar conclusion and
further show that the relationship between education and the amount remitted is non-linear.
A common issue that previous microdata studies share is that they are based on survey data
collected in migrants’ destination countries, and thus not able to incorporate the economic situation
and the characteristics of the household left behind in their analysis.4 However, the economic
conditions in migrants’ home region and the characteristics of the origin household, for example,
the income level, are important determinants of the remittance behaviour of migrants.5
We overcome these issues by analysing the effect of migrants’ education on their remitting
behaviour using unique household survey data from five Sub-Saharan African sending countries,
namely Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. This database has two main advantages:
First, it contains comprehensive information on both the migrant and the household left behind,
enabling us to control for characteristics of both sides of the migrant-household relationship.
Second, previous studies concerning remittances and high-skilled migration focus only on individuals
who migrated to OECD countries, which represent a very selective group of migrants.6 Yet, the
emigration of high skilled individuals is not only reflected in migration flows from low-income to
high-income countries, but is also a regional and local concern. For instance, the movement of highly
educated individuals within national borders, usually from rural to urban areas, can result in a
persistent state of underdevelopment and impoverishment (George, Dei, & Asgharzadeh, 2002). To
address this, we use a sample of all individuals having migrated from five sending countries to
different destinations, including OECD countries, non-OECD countries as well as internal migrants.
Hence, we are able to provide important insights into the remitting behaviour of the largest, but so far
neglected groups of migrants – internal migrants and migrants in non-OECD destination countries.7
Overall, we do not find evidence that education is a determinant of the likelihood of sending
remittances. It is, however, an important factor to determine the amount of remittances sent.
Conditional on sending remittances, migrants with a university degree send a significantly higher
amount than migrants with lower levels of education. These results are robust to a number of
sensitivity analyses. This suggests that some of the negative externalities of the brain drain on the
source countries can be counterbalanced by migrants’ remittances. These effects hold for the sub-
samples of internal migrants and migrants in non-OECD countries. For migrants in OECD destination
countries, however, the positive effect of education on the amount of remittances sent vanishes once
characteristics of the household at the origin country are controlled for. This result highlights the
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importance of controlling for characteristics of both sides of the migrant-household relationship when
analysing migrants’ remittance behaviour.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section outlines the empirical methodology.
Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we discuss our
estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical model
To identify the effect of migrants’ education on their remittance behaviour, we estimate a model in which
migrants’ remittances are a function of a set of independent variables containing information on the
migrants and their households left behind. In our baseline specification, we estimate the following model:
Rij ¼ αþ β0Ei þ θ0Xi þ γ0Hj þ δd þ ηr þ ij; (1)
where Rij measures remittances sent by migrant i to household j. Ei is a dummy variable indicating if
the individual has a university degree or not, Xi represents a vector of individual demographic
characteristics, Hj is a vector of characteristics of the household at the origin country, and ij represents
the error term. Our key coefficient of interest is β, the estimated impact of having a university degree
on migrants’ remittance behaviour.
To account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the destination (for example, labour
market characteristics) and the origin level (for example, educational quality), we further add
destination-country fixed effects, δd , and origin-region fixed effects at the district level, ηr, to the
estimation model. Destination and origin-region fixed effects are also important to control for the
selection of specific types of individuals into migration and their sorting into specific destination
countries (Licuanan, Mahmoud, & Steinmayr, 2015). For instance, migrants who have a high
motivation to remit may choose to locate in countries with high wages. These countries may also
primarily demand high-skilled migrants, because of their high labour market standards. As a result,
the relationship between migrants’ education and the level of remittances sent may be biased,
because it merely reflects the type of migrants who choose to live in these countries. On the
origin-region side, it is likely that regions that regularly face natural disasters, such as droughts
and floods, receive more remittances. At the same time, it is likely that the educational infra-
structure in these regions is comparatively underdeveloped and that migrants are mainly low
skilled. If the origin region’s exposure to natural disasters and other local characteristics are not
controlled for, the estimated effect of migrants’ education on their remittance behaviour is there-
fore likely to be biased.
In the above specification, we control for observed characteristics of the migrant and the
household at the origin country. Of course, there might also exist some unobserved factors at
both levels that we cannot account for. We might not be able to perfectly capture the local
conditions of the area the origin household is located in, which might be correlated with both
migrants’ remittances and their level of education. Also, unobserved heterogeneity at the indivi-
dual level, for example, due to ability, might still affect our estimates. Hence, while we are able to
largely reduce the problem of unobserved heterogeneity across migrants’ origin households that is
present in other studies, we do not claim to estimate a true causal effect of migrants’ education on
their remittance behaviour.
Similar to Bollard et al. (2011), we use three alternative measures of remittances. First, in order to
capture the overall effect of migrants’ education on remittances, we use the reported total amount of
remittances to capture both the extensive and intensive margin. Second, we create a binary variable
that indicates whether the migrant remits or not (extensive margin). Third, we use the logarithm of the
amount of remittances conditional on remitting (intensive margin). For all three outcomes, the model is
estimated using OLS.8 To account for within-household correlation, the standard errors are clustered at
the origin-household level.
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3. Data
3.1. The migration and remittances household surveys
The data used in our empirical analysis comes from the Migration and Remittances Households
Surveys conducted in 2009–2010 by the World Bank in six Sub-Saharan African countries: Burkina
Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, and South Africa (Plaza, Navarrete, & Ratha, 2011). The
single household surveys are part of the Africa Migration Project and are standardised across
countries, which allows us to combine them to a unique cross-country dataset.9 An exception is the
survey for South Africa, which differs because South Africa represents a migrant-receiving country
rather than a migrant-sending country, and is therefore excluded from our analysis.
In each country, about 2000 households were interviewed and comprehensive information on the
household at the origin country as well as on the characteristics of all household members was
collected – of those still living in the household and of former household members who migrated.
As highlighted by Osili (2007) and De Brauw, Mueller, and Woldehanna (2013), having data on both
the sending and the receiving household is crucial for understanding migrants’ remittance behaviour.
While previous studies on the brain drain and migrants’ remittance behaviour observe only one side of
the migrant-origin family transaction, we are the first to be able to consider comprehensive information
on both sending and receiving households. In particular, the data contains information on the level of
remittances sent by each former household member to the origin household. In contrast to macro
databases on bilateral remittances, which only capture remittances sent through formal channels, this
includes remittances sent through both formal and informal channels and thus represents a more
reliable measure of migrants’ remittances (Clemens & McKenzie, 2018).
In addition, a main feature of the data is that it not only reports information on migrants who live
abroad, but also on internal migrants, who mainly moved from rural to urban areas. Hence, in contrast
to previous studies, which only consider migrants to OECD countries, we observe a sample of all
individuals who have migrated from five sending countries to different destinations, including OECD
countries, non-OECD countries as well as internal migrants. Having data from migrants’ sending
countries further enables us to consider undocumented migrants, which are usually not included in
surveys collected in migrants’ destination countries.
Household surveys collected in migrants’ sending countries have the disadvantage, though, that
they are likely to miss migrants who emigrated with their entire household. However, as Bollard
et al. (2011) show, household composition in the destination country is about the same for high- and
low-skilled migrants, which makes us confident that this sort of selectivity will hardly affect our
estimation results.
For the purpose of our identification strategy, we restrict the sample to households that report to
have at least one former household member that migrated before the interview was conducted.
Moreover, we restrict our sample to migrants aged 24 and older, the age at which most individuals
should have finished a (undergraduate) university degree. Considering both internal and international
migrants, the overall sample consists of 7536 migrants from 4460 origin households.
3.2. Variables
With respect to the dependent variable, migrants’ remittances, the households report the amount of
remittances received from each migrant in the last 12 months before the interview was conducted. In
order to make remittance and income levels comparable across countries, we convert all financial
values to US dollars using the average exchange rate for 2009 for each local currency.10
Regarding our variable of interest, we create a binary variable indicating whether the individual has
a university degree or completed postgraduate studies. All individuals with lower education levels are
included in the reference group. With respect to migrants’ demographic characteristics, we control for
gender, age, marital status, and years spent at the destination country. To allow for non-linear effects,
the latter two variables are further included as squared terms. In addition, we include a binary variable
indicating if the individual migrated internally. We also control for the migration reason by indicating
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if the decision was made to search for a job, to pursue education, to reunite with family members, or
for other reasons (for example, related to conflict or weather conditions).
Unfortunately, we do not have information on the migrant’s income level at the destination country.
As argued, amongst others, by Bollard et al. (2011), income should be one of the main channels
through which education affects remittances. We aim to address this problem by controlling for factors
that are highly correlated with migrants’ income and that can thus serve as a proxy for their
unobserved earnings potential. Specifically, we control for the current labour force status of the
migrant, distinguishing between full-time employment, part-time employment, self-employment, and
not participating in the labour force. In addition, we have information on migrants’ occupation at the
destination country. However, as this information is available for a large fraction, but not for all
migrants in our sample, we refrain from using it in our baseline regressions, but rather conduct a
robustness check in which we control for migrants’ occupation level (see Section 4.2). We argue that
once migrants’ education, their labour force status, their occupation and their destination country (see
below) are accounted for, migrants’ income should have a minor impact on their remittance behaviour.
Nevertheless, when interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that part of the effect of migrants’
education on remittances might represent an indirect effect that operates through migrants’ income.
We also control for the relationship of the migrant to the current household head in the origin
country. We distinguish between spouses, children, and other relatives of the household head, whom
we expect to have different motives to remit. Finally, we add indicator variables for different groups of
destination countries, which we categorise in four groups according to their income level: high, upper-
middle, lower-middle and low-income (see World Bank, 2015). Alternatively, we include destination-
country fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics of the destination country.
We further control for a comprehensive set of characteristics of the households at the origin country.
We proxy the non-remittance income by total household expenditures minus remittance income.11 As
the time base for different expenditures varies over the categories, we aggregate weekly and monthly
values to yearly values, to obtain a measure of the household’s total expenditures. We also include
additional controls that are related to the socio-economic status of the family or its wealth, that is,
indicators for house ownership, agricultural land ownership, and access to electricity. Furthermore, we
account for the demographic composition of the household by including household size, the number of
migrants, a dummy variable indicating if the household head is male, and the share of dependents
(children, unemployed, and elderly people). We build the latter variable by aggregating the number of
household members who are not part of the labour force and dividing it by the total household size.12
4. Results
4.1. Baseline results
The results of estimating Equation (1) are presented in Tables 1–3. We start our analysis by estimating
the effect of education on the total amount of remittances sent using a sample of all migrants, that is,
unconditional on whether the migrants send remittances or not. Column I in Table 1 shows a
parsimonious specification that controls for migrant characteristics, origin-country fixed effects, and
the income group of the destination country. The results reveal that migrants with a university degree
remit, on average, about 304 USD more than less educated migrants. When including destination-
country fixed effects to control for destination-specific factors, such as differences in wages or
employment probabilities, the coefficient slightly decreases in magnitude but remains similar in
terms of significance (column II). In subsequent columns, we stepwise add the households’ level of
non-remittance income and further important household characteristics to the model. When controlling
for household income (column III), which itself is negatively correlated with migrants’ remittances, the
estimated effect of having a university degree increases to 362 USD. This reveals that indeed, migrants
from high-income households do remit less and are more highly educated, which creates a spurious
relationship between migrants’ education and their remittance flows. When adding further origin-
household characteristics (column IV) as well as district fixed effects to capture the large regional
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Table 1. Determinants of total remittances
I II III IV V VI
Migrant characteristics
University degree 304.347** 264.887** 362.047*** 310.308*** 266.056** 324.550***
(121.782) (115.750) (111.322) (111.833) (116.173) (114.713)
Male 113.812** 108.770** 76.101 53.636 57.101 78.553
(53.747) (54.254) (53.706) (53.065) (53.169) (52.268)
Age/100 1767.159 1707.245 1201.858 1891.96 1845.445 2747.436**
(1264.618) (1221.513) (1165.878) (1195.994) (1169.339) (1177.177)
Age2/100 −11.562 −11.498 −5.874 −12.640 −11.518 −21.777
(15.612) (15.057) (14.511) (14.694) (14.345) (14.399)
Married −35.108 −41.209 −87.859 −94.680 −87.677 −53.971
(66.575) (67.092) (66.142) (65.430) (65.218) (64.130)
Years since emigration/100 2864.915† 2928.082† 2610.332† 2868.509† 2525.085† 2766.126†
(696.883) (672.943) (616.723) (651.877) (626.797) (668.647)
Years since emigration2/100 −62.447*** −61.392*** −52.301*** −56.366*** −48.229*** −52.743***
(20.708) (19.630) (17.287) (18.343) (16.677) (18.567)
Internal migrant −220.636† −305.913 −277.224 −225.955 −217.639 −205.398
(56.334) (221.937) (227.159) (231.447) (241.298) (242.110)
Migration reason (Ref: Work related)
Education −122.057 −159.077 −128.635 −115.485 −149.851* −261.995***
(89.802) (96.764) (87.971) (86.455) (87.525) (88.064)
Family −9.841 −6.367 17.562 18.319 −49.369 −159.948**
(81.900) (81.697) (80.200) (78.479) (80.231) (74.755)
Other −162.757 −188.992* −168.113 −164.569 −193.083* −261.176**
(106.982) (101.406) (102.974) (104.706) (104.016) (103.316)
Labour force status (Ref: Full time employed)
Part time employed −396.725† −421.848† −434.447† −424.955† −402.683† –
(90.701) (94.691) (82.452) (80.070) (77.712)
Self employed −268.703† −274.616† −277.084† −254.268† −316.401† –
(53.473) (53.278) (50.250) (50.086) (52.326)
Not in labour force −503.773† −501.718† −491.095† −480.211† −445.952† –
(69.164) (69.008) (69.913) (65.986) (67.582)
Relationship to head (Ref: Child)
Partner 872.764† 856.252† 781.819† 775.176† 727.787† 737.424†
(133.360) (134.678) (133.108) (129.615) (128.382) (128.745)
Sibling −178.376† −170.931† −157.621† −216.933† −201.391† −199.976†
(47.080) (48.252) (46.096) (47.498) (50.364) (50.853)
Other relative −110.421* −100.386* −150.760** −184.884*** −151.461** −158.482**
(60.091) (59.860) (58.940) (59.081) (61.988) (62.195)
Destination (Ref: Low income country)
High income 842.737† – – – – –
(129.577)
Upper-middle income 521.760*** – – – – –
(168.709)
Lower-middle income −130.289** – – – – –
(56.866)
Origin HH characteristics
ln(non-remittance income) – – −179.887† −198.641† −213.611† −214.228†
(25.050) (25.939) (27.202) (27.410)
Urban – – – 98.089* 112.143* 134.240**
(55.497) (66.359) (66.950)
Number of migrants – – – −41.674† −46.096*** −45.619***
(11.798) (14.440) (15.197)
HH head is male – – – 50.059 72.167 79.811
(59.113) (58.142) (58.867)
House is owned – – – 21.714 137.272 159.036*
(76.208) (89.360) (92.250)
Land is owned – – – −93.248 52.681 69.417
(63.057) (62.715) (64.497)
Electricity – – – 185.409*** 145.870* 157.871**
(59.244) (77.661) (77.218)
HH size – – – 31.046† 32.032† 31.584†
(5.081) (5.629) (5.681)
Share of dependents – – – −79.513 6.716 16.752
(98.802) (98.892) (99.257)
(continued )
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heterogeneity within the origin countries (column V), the estimated education effect decreases to 310
USD and 266 USD, respectively. This suggests that both the economic situation of the household left
behind and regional economic conditions at the origin country matter for migrants’ remittance
behaviour and are correlated with their degree of education obtained. Lastly, to test whether the effect
of education operates through other channels such as income, we exclude the labour force status of the
migrant from the estimation model (column VI). Indeed, the results show a strong increase in the
estimated education effect, which implies that a large part of the impact of education on remittances
works through the labour market success of the migrant in the destination country. In general, our
results reveal that migrants with a university degree remit around 265–362 USD more per year than
non-university educated migrants. Given that migrants remit 547 USD on average (see Table A1 in the
Appendix), the difference in the amount of remittances sent by high- and low-skilled migrants is
sizeable.
We next split the effect on the total level of remittances into two separate effects: the effect on the
extensive margin and the effect on the intensive margin. The results for the extensive margin,
migrants’ probability to send remittances, are reported in Table 2. The estimated coefficients for
having a university degree are negative and not statistically significant for all specifications, which
reveals that the level of education is not a determinant of the decision to send remittances. Only when
excluding the labour force status of the migrant from the estimation (column VI), the education effect
turns positive, but is still not statistically significant. Hence, we do not find evidence that migrants’
level of education is a determinant of their decision to remit.
The results for the intensive margin, the amount sent conditional on sending remittances, are
reported in Table 3. For all specifications, the estimated effect of having a university degree is positive
and highly significant. This reveals that, conditional on sending remittances, high-skilled migrants
send higher amounts of money to their households left behind as compared to their lower skilled
counterparts. In our basic specification (column I), the estimated education effect is about 0.51,
suggesting that migrants with a university degree remit about 51 per cent more than migrants without
a university degree. This effect, however, largely decreases once origin-household characteristics
(columns III and IV) are controlled for. In our preferred specification (column V), which further
includes district fixed effects, migrants with a university degree remit around 31 per cent more than
migrants without a university degree. Given that, conditional on remitting, migrants remit on average
991 USD (Table A1), high-skilled migrants send on average around 307 USD more than low-skilled
migrants.
Overall, our results reveal that high-skilled migrants do send larger amounts of remittances than
low-skilled migrants and thus contradict the findings of most of the previous literature based on
macrodata (for example, Adams, 2009; Faini, 2007; Niimi et al., 2010). They are, though, in line with
Bollard et al. (2011), who also find no robust effect of migrants’ education on remittances at the
extensive margin, but a positive effect at the intensive margin. However, our findings further reveal
that part of the positive association between migrants’ education and the amount of money sent is
Table 1. (Continued)
I II III IV V VI
Constant −159.428 −284.764 1178.916† 989.638† 1343.401† 772.776**
(255.122) (243.714) (288.767) (277.943) (376.194) (370.191)
Destination FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Origin FE yes yes yes yes no No
District FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536
Adj-R2 0.138 0.145 0.187 0.196 0.217 0.211
Notes: Results are obtained from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the origin-house-
hold level). †p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 2. Determinants of the probability of sending remittances
I II III IV V VI
Migrant characteristics
University degree −0.030 −0.030 −0.016 −0.001 −0.006 0.022
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Male 0.039*** 0.038** 0.034** 0.025* 0.019 0.053†
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Age/100 0.789** 0.761** 0.687* 0.602* 0.768** 1.558†
(0.361) (0.359) (0.355) (0.355) (0.356) (0.391)
Age2/100 −0.008* −0.007* −0.007 −0.006 −0.007* −0.016†
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Married 0.098† 0.098† 0.091† 0.088† 0.078† 0.107†
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Years since emigration/100 0.442* 0.457* 0.410* 0.420* 0.437* 0.660**
(0.246) (0.247) (0.237) (0.245) (0.236) (0.273)
Years since emigration2/100 −0.013* −0.013* −0.012 −0.012 −0.012* −0.017*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Internal migrant 0.003 −0.011 −0.007 −0.006 0.023 0.035
(0.018) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
Migration reason (Ref: Work related)
Education −0.106† −0.114† −0.109† −0.102† −0.088† −0.216†
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Family −0.115† −0.118† −0.114† −0.102† −0.088† −0.194†
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Other −0.216† −0.212† −0.209† −0.197† −0.198† −0.257†
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Labour force status (Ref: Full time employed)
Part time employed −0.072** −0.069** −0.071*** −0.077*** −0.091† –
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Self employed −0.104† −0.104† −0.105† −0.104† −0.095† –
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Not in labour force −0.393† −0.391† −0.389† −0.388† −0.388† –
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Relationship to head (Ref: Child)
Partner 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.044* 0.031 0.039
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Sibling −0.117† −0.116† −0.115† −0.104† −0.104† −0.100†
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Other relative −0.074† −0.073*** −0.080† −0.077† −0.098† −0.105†
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Destination (Ref: Low income country)
High income 0.110† – – – – –
(0.028)
Upper-middle income 0.130† – – – – –
(0.038)
Lower-middle income −0.030 – – – – –
(0.021)
Origin HH characteristics
ln(non-remittance income) – – −0.026† −0.028† −0.025† −0.026†
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban – – – 0.010 0.001 0.011
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Number of migrants – – – −0.013† −0.016† −0.016†
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
HH head is male – – – −0.051*** −0.057*** −0.048***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
House is owned – – – 0.058*** 0.025 0.047**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Land is owned – – – 0.039** 0.033* 0.047**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Electricity – – – 0.005 0.033 0.038*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
HH size – – – 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of dependents – – – 0.071*** 0.065** 0.067**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
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driven by differences in the characteristics of the households at the origin country, which are correlated
with both migrants’ education and their remittances. This again highlights the importance of observing
both sides of the migrant-origin family relationship when analysing migrants’ remittance behaviour.
With respect to other individual characteristics determining migrants’ remittance behaviour, our
results are largely consistent with theoretical predictions and the findings of previous literature. We
find that male migrants remit more than female migrants, but this is mainly driven by the intensive
margin. Moreover, married migrants are more likely to remit than unmarried migrants, while the
amount remitted is uncorrelated with migrants’ marital status. The amount of remittances sent further
increases with both the age of the migrant and the years spent at the destination country, though at a
decreasing rate.13 The latter result might be explained by two effects working against each other: on
the one hand, migrants’ income is likely to rise with increasing labour market experience in the
destination country, leading them to remit higher amounts after having spent more time in the
destination country. On the other hand, migrants’ intention to return to the origin country is likely
to decrease with years spent in the destination country, leading to a negative correlation between years
since migration and remittances. This interpretation is in line with the results of Bollard et al. (2010),
who for a sample of African migrants in OECD countries do not find a significant relationship
between remittances and years spent abroad once migrants’ income and their return intentions are
controlled for.
Somewhat surprisingly, internal migrants are as likely to remit as international migrants. Among
those remitting, however, internal migrants remit significantly lower amounts to their households left
behind than international migrants. Individuals who migrated for work-related reasons are significantly
more likely to remit than individuals who migrated for any other reason, while the relationship
between the amount remitted and migrants’ reason for migrating is less clear. In addition, migrants
who have a full-time job are both more likely to remit and do remit more than migrants with a different
labour force status. These results are consistent with the findings of Vanwey (2004) and Bouoiyour
and Miftah (2015) and lend support to the altruism motive of remittances. They do, though, contradict
the insurance motive of remittances (for example, Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2006), which suggests
that a precarious situation of the migrant should affect their transfers in a positive way.
Our results further reveal that the relationship of the migrant to the household head in the origin
country is an important determinant of his or her remittance behaviour: while spouses tend to remit
more than children, siblings and more distant relatives remit less, though these negative effects are
only significant at the extensive margin. Lastly, our results reveal that compared to migrants residing
in low-income destination countries, migrants in high-income and upper-middle-income countries are
both more likely to send remittances and send higher amounts of money, conditional on remitting.
With respect to the characteristics of the households at the origin country, we find the households’
non-remittance income to have a negative impact on both the probability to remit and the amount of
money sent, conditional on remitting. Moreover, household size and the share of dependents at the
origin household are positively correlated with migrants’ remittances, while the latter effect is only
significant at the extensive margin. These findings support the hypothesis that migrants from better-off
Table 2. (Continued)
I II III IV V VI
Constant 0.393† 0.352† 0.566† 0.516† 0.562† 0.176
(0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.086) (0.117) (0.119)
Destination FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Origin FE yes yes yes yes no no
District FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536 7,536
Adj-R2 0.213 0.217 0.230 0.240 0.277 0.225
Notes: Results are obtained from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the origin-house-
hold level). †p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 3. Determinants of the amount of remittances
I II III IV V VI
Migrant characteristics
University degree 0.514† 0.439† 0.472† 0.374† 0.307† 0.354†
(0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083)
Male 0.165** 0.173*** 0.152** 0.127** 0.102* 0.122**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.063) (0.057) (0.057)
Age/100 3.397** 3.734** 3.169** 3.490** 4.819† 6.081†
(1.483) (1.486) (1.455) (1.388) (1.410) (1.479)
Age2/100 −0.036** −0.040** −0.033** −0.035** −0.049*** −0.063†
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Married −0.007 0.002 −0.018 −0.004 −0.036 −0.025
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051)
Years since emigration/100 2.150*** 2.222*** 2.003*** 2.291† 2.142† 2.316†
(0.768) (0.746) (0.685) (0.695) (0.619) (0.665)
Years since emigration2/100 −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.047*** −0.052*** −0.045*** −0.047***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016)
Internal migrant −0.544† −1.355† −1.337† −1.148† −0.992† −1.016†
(0.069) (0.256) (0.258) (0.262) (0.259) (0.261)
Migration reason (Ref: Work related)
Education 0.154 0.107 0.134 0.181** 0.094 0.031
(0.100) (0.102) (0.090) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085)
Family 0.137 0.154 0.161* 0.140 0.032 −0.107
(0.093) (0.095) (0.093) (0.089) (0.078) (0.079)
Other −0.432*** −0.465*** −0.425*** −0.447*** −0.474*** −0.533†
(0.153) (0.154) (0.156) (0.153) (0.152) (0.155)
Labour force status (Ref: Full time employed)
Part time employed −0.427† −0.444† −0.446† −0.422† −0.436† –
(0.101) (0.100) (0.086) (0.082) (0.083)
Self employed −0.435† −0.450† −0.456† −0.375† −0.331† –
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.058) (0.055)
Not in labour force −1.003† −0.991† −0.991† −0.947† −0.723† –
(0.125) (0.125) (0.114) (0.109) (0.093)
Relationship to head (Ref: Child)
Partner 0.799† 0.764† 0.717† 0.634† 0.588† 0.602†
(0.085) (0.085) (0.082) (0.085) (0.081) (0.082)
Sibling −0.032 −0.062 −0.056 −0.111* −0.080 −0.074
(0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
Other relative −0.049 −0.057 −0.105 −0.148** −0.129* −0.141*
(0.087) (0.086) (0.082) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
Destination (Ref: Low income country)
High income 1.193† – – – – –
(0.113)
Upper-middle income 1.050† – – – – –
(0.143)
Lower-middle income 0.272† – – – – –
(0.077)
Origin HH characteristics
ln(non-remittance income) – – −0.111† −0.138† −0.131† −0.130†
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Urban – – – 0.144** 0.089 0.116
(0.069) (0.081) (0.081)
Number of migrants – – – −0.064† −0.072† −0.074†
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
HH head is – – – −0.001 0.045 0.064
(0.069) (0.062) (0.064)
House is owned – – – −0.052 0.053 0.095
(0.069) (0.071) (0.074)
Land is owned – – – −0.107* 0.080 0.105
(0.063) (0.072) (0.074)
Electricity – – – 0.506† 0.406† 0.425†
(0.070) (0.071) (0.073)
HH size – – – 0.030† 0.026† 0.025†
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share of dependents – – – −0.130 0.040 0.035
(0.109) (0.096) (0.098)
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households remit lower amounts to their families left behind. At both margins, the number of migrants
from the origin household is negatively correlated with migrants’ remittances. This result confirms the
findings of Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) and De Brauw et al. (2013) and supports the altruism
motive, but not the insurance motive of remittances.
With respect to the remaining household characteristics, we find varying effects at the extensive and
at the intensive margin. Migrants from male-headed households, for example, are less likely to send
remittances, while there is no such effect at the intensive margin. Consistent with the bequest motive
(see, for example, Hoddinott, 1994; Melkonyan & Grigorian, 2012), we find that households that own
their house or agricultural land tend to be more likely to receive remittances, but these characteristics
are uncorrelated with the amount of remittances received.14 Overall, our results reveal that origin
household characteristics, particularly those related to the socio-economic status of the family, are
important determinants of migrants’ remittance behaviour.
4.2. Robustness checks
In order to examine the robustness of our main findings, we conduct a number of sensitivity checks.
We do so by estimating Equation (1) for our preferred specification including the full set of
individual and household controls, destination fixed effects, and origin-district fixed effects (column
V of Tables 1–3). The main results of these robustness checks, that is, the estimated coefficients for
the effect of migrants’ education on remittances, are summarised in Table 4.
First, as outlined in Section 3.2, there might be an issue because the income level of the migrant
cannot directly be observed in the data. As migrants’ income is likely to be correlated with both their
education level and their remittance behaviour, we might not be able to fully separate the (presumably
positive) income effect on remittances from the effect of education on remittances. While potential
solutions are limited by the data available, we check the robustness of our results by additionally
controlling for migrants’ occupation in the destination country, which we assume to be highly
correlated with their income level.15 The respective results are displayed in Panel A of Table 4. As
in our baseline results, we do not find a significant impact of migrants’ education on their likelihood of
sending remittances, but a positive effect on the amount of remittances for those remitting. The latter
effect is slightly smaller than in our baseline regression (0.27 as compared to 0.31), but still large and
highly significant. Assuming migrants’ occupation to be highly correlated with their income level, this
suggests that not controlling for income does not largely affect our results.
Second, there is a concern that our findings might be driven by students, who are likely to send
lower amounts of remittances to their origin households, or by individuals who migrated for the
purpose of pursuing education in the destination country. This would be in line with the investment
motive, which suggests that the origin household supports the migrant early in life to further his
education, while the migrant starts to fulfil his part of the implicit contract only later in his life-cycle,
when his income increases (see, Cox, Eser, & Jimenez, 1998; Rapoport & Docquier, 2006). To test
whether this is driving our results, we re-estimate our model for two different samples: (i) a sample
Table 3. (Continued)
I II III IV V VI
Constant 3.483† 3.605† 4.540† 4.616† 4.709† 4.054†
(0.316) (0.313) (0.318) (0.324) (0.451) (0.470)
Destination FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Origin FE yes yes yes yes no no
District FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Adj-R2 0.435 0.447 0.472 0.500 0.562 0.551
Notes: Results are obtained from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the origin-house-
hold level). †p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 4. Robustness checks
Total remittances Extensive margin Intensive margin
A. Controlling for migrants’ occupation
Controlling for migrants’ occupation
University degree 208.115* −0.001 0.269***
(125.526) (0.022) (0.086)
Observations 6,820 6,820 3,753
B. Sample restrictions
Excl. Students
University degree 282.289** −0.010 0.292†
(132.775) (0.024) (0.084)
Observations 7,054 7,054 4,105
Excl. if migrated to study
University degree 325.539** −0.018 0.395†
(153.012) (0.026) (0.089)
Observations 6,544 6,544 3,777
C. Alternative skill definition
University or vocational education
University degree 242.392† 0.026 0.363†
(65.850) (0.016) (0.056)
Observations 7,536 7,536 4,164
D. Excl. single origin countries
Excl. Burkina Faso
University degree 264.594** −0.009 0.308†
(117.982) (0.021) (0.083)
Observations 6,109 6,109 3,467
Excl. Kenya
University degree 243.222** 0.032 0.234**
(120.481) (0.025) (0.113)
Observations 6,093 6,093 3,352
Excl. Nigeria
University degree 258.311** −0.021 0.396†
(128.295) (0.025) (0.096)
Observations 5,493 5,493 3,015
Excl. Senegal
University degree 314.906** 0.003 0.316†
(134.807) (0.024) (0.090)
Observations 5,861 5,861 3,011
Excl. Uganda
University degree 232.581* −0.027 0.257***
(138.636) (0.024) (0.086)
Observations 6,588 6,588 3,811
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that excludes migrants who are still in education and (ii) a sample that excludes individuals who
migrated in order to pursue education. The respective results are shown in Panel B of Table 4. For both
samples, our previous findings hold. At the intensive margin, the coefficient for migrants’ university
degree slightly increases once individuals who migrated in order to pursue education are excluded, but
is overall stable in significance and magnitude.
Third, we check whether our results are sensitive to the definition of the skill level of the migrant.
Specifically, we estimate an alternative specification in which we define high-skilled migrants as those
who have obtained a university degree or a vocational education degree. The respective estimates
using this broader definition of high-skilled migrants are presented in Panel C of Table 4. At the
intensive margin, the coefficient for migrants’ education remains similar in both magnitude and
significance. At the extensive margin, however, we now find a significantly positive (at the 10%
level), though small, effect of migrants’ education on their probability to remit, suggesting that
migrants with a vocational degree are slightly more likely to remit than migrants with a lower
educational qualification.
Fourth, there might be a concern that our results do not hold for all origin countries, but are driven
by a single country. We therefore successively exclude one origin country from the sample and
estimate Equation (1) based on the remaining four origin countries.16 The results of these five
regressions are shown in Panel D of Table 4. While the size of the positive effect of education on
the amount of remittances sent slightly varies over the different countries, our results are overall robust
and confirm that our estimates are not driven by a single origin country.
Lastly, we check whether our findings are robust to the estimation method chosen to generate our
results. In our baseline specification, we estimate our model using OLS for all outcomes. While this is
an obvious choice for the intensive margin of migrants’ remittances, the censored nature of the total
amount of remittances and the binary nature of the probability to remit might call for the use of a
nonlinear estimation method. In Panel E of Table 4, we therefore use a Tobit model to estimate the
total amount of remittances and a Probit model to estimate the probability to remit. The results are
robust to this alternative model choice in terms of both significance and magnitude.17
In addition, when analysing the intensive margin of remittances, we have implicitly assumed that
the choice of how much to remit is independent of the decision to remit. However, this is not
necessarily the case and hence migrants who remit may be a non-random sample of the migrants’
population. To address this issue, we alternatively use a selection model as proposed by Heckman
(1976) to correct for selection in the remittances equation. As is well known, this model generally
requires an exclusion restriction, that is, at least one variable that affects selection but not the outcome
Table 4. (Continued)
Total remittances Extensive margin Intensive margin
E. Alternative estimation methods
Tobit Probit Heckman
University degree 318.227* −0.006 0.336†
(162.967) (0.022) (0.072)
Inverse mills ratio − − 0.318
(0.232)
Observations 7,536 7,477 4,164
Notes: All results are obtained from regressions of Equation (1) for our preferred specification including a full set
of individual and household controls, destination fixed effects, and origin-district fixed effects (column V of
Table 1–3). Panels A to D show coefficients of OLS regressions. Panel E shows coefficients of a Tobit regression,
average marginal effects of a Probit regression, and coefficients of the outcome equation of a Heckman selection
model (the results of the selection equation are similar to the Probit results). Standard errors in parentheses
(clustered at the origin-household level). †p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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of interest. However, as finding a valid exclusion restriction is difficult to achieve in our context,
identification in our model crucially relies on the nonlinearity of the selection bias. The results of the
second stage of the Heckman selection model are shown in the third column of Panel E. With a
coefficient of 0.34, the estimated effect of having a university degree is only slightly higher than in the
baseline regression (0.31), so the results are robust to this alternative specification. Also, the inverse
mills ratio, which is the covariance between the errors of the selection and the outcome equation, is not
statistically significant, suggesting that selection into remitting is of minor relevance in our context.18
4.3. Heterogeneous effects across migrants’ destination countries
In Section 4.1, we have shown that migrants living in wealthier destination countries have a higher
probability of sending remittances and send larger amounts of money to their households left behind.
Moreover, internal migrants appear to send lower amounts than international migrants (Tables 1–3). To
gain further insights into the heterogeneous effects of migrants’ education on their remittance
behaviour in different destination countries, we split the baseline sample into three sub-samples: (i)
migrants in OECD destination countries, (ii) migrants in non-OECD destination countries, and (iii)
internal migrants.
Although OECD migrants are more likely to remit and remit higher amounts than non-OECD and
internal migrants (see Table B1 in the Supplementary Materials), the money sent by the latter two
groups makes up for a large proportion of the total level of remittances received by the origin
countries. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the amount of remittances received from (i)
OECD migrants, (ii) non-OECD migrants, and (iii) internal migrants as a share of the total remittances
received by all households in the respective origin country. Remittances received from non-OECD and
internal migrants make up for 35 to 47 per cent of the total level of remittances received by households
in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, and even account for 90 per cent of the total amount of
remittances in Burkina Faso. This again highlights the importance of investigating the remittance
behaviour of all migrants, and not restricting the analysis to migrants in OECD countries.
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Figure 2. Share of the total level of remittances received by destination country.
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Based on estimating Equation (1), Table 5 reports the coefficients of our variable of interest, the
estimated effect of migrants’ education on the extensive and intensive margin of remittances, sepa-
rately for the three different destination groups.19 In line with our previously presented results, the
estimated effect of having a university degree on the likelihood of sending remittances is small and not
statistically significant across all specifications for the three destination groups (Panel A). This reveals
that, irrespective of their destination, migrants with a university degree do not have a higher
probability of sending remittances than migrants without a university degree.
At the intensive margin (Panel B), we find evidence that conditional on sending remittances, high-
skilled migrants in non-OECD countries and internal migrants send larger amounts of money
compared to less skilled migrants. In our preferred specification (column V), the estimated education
effect is 0.79 and 0.39, respectively, suggesting that high-skilled individuals that migrate to a non-
OECD country remit about 79 per cent and high-skilled individuals that migrate internally remit about
39 per cent more than comparable migrants without a university degree. Given the average amount of
Table 5. Effect of education on remittances by destination country
I II III IV V VI
A. Extensive margin
OECD countries
University degree −0.042 −0.049 −0.035 −0.022 −0.053 −0.039
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
Observations 1,589
Non-OECD countries
University degree −0.068 −0.028 −0.019 −0.001 −0.007 0.008
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.065) (0.068)
Observations 1,663
Internal migrants
University degree −0.024 −0.024 −0.008 0.006 −0.002 0.039
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 4,284
B. Intensive margin
OECD countries
University degree 0.209 0.216* 0.233* 0.174 0.095 0.110
(0.127) (0.127) (0.122) (0.120) (0.134) (0.133)
Observations 1,111
Non-OECD countries
University degree 0.827*** 0.541** 0.595** 0.609** 0.787*** 0.850***
(0.270) (0.268) (0.269) (0.266) (0.301) (0.311)
Observations 902
Internal migrants
University degree 0.620† 0.620† 0.668† 0.530† 0.394† 0.460†
(0.121) (0.121) (0.119) (0.109) (0.113) (0.114)
Observations 2,151
Individual Controls all all all all all no LFS
HH Controls no no income all all all
Destination FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Origin FE yes yes yes yes no no
District FE no no no no yes yes
Notes: Results are obtained from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the origin-house-
hold level). †p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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remittances sent by these groups, high-skilled migrants in non-OECD countries remit around 574 USD
and high-skilled internal migrants remit about 174 USD more than comparable low-skilled migrants in
these countries.
The results for migrants in OECD countries, in contrast, differ from the findings of previous literature.
The estimated effect of having a university degree is positive, but substantially smaller than the estimated
effects for the other two destination groups. In addition, the estimated coefficient decreases further and
becomes insignificant once the full set of household characteristics and district fixed effects (columns
IV–VI) are controlled for. According to these results, high-skilled migrants living in OECD countries do
not send more remittances than comparable low-skilled migrants in these countries.
One reasonable explanation for this pattern might be migrants’ educational downgrading in destina-
tion countries (Dustmann & Glitz, 2011). In OECD countries, with their high educational standards,
the education level of migrants might not be fully recognised in the labour market. Therefore, in the
destination country, high-skilled migrants may work in jobs that require lower qualifications than the
jobs they held in their home country, and they may thus work in similar jobs as lower skilled migrants.
This conjecture is supported by our data: in OECD countries, migrants with a university degree show
only a 35 per cent higher probability of working in a high-skilled job than migrants without a
university degree. Compared to the figures for migrants in non-OECD countries (222%) and internal
migrants (71%), this is a particular low probability, supporting the existence of a strong educational
downgrading of migrants in OECD destination countries.20 In the OECD labour markets, migrants’
returns to having a university degree obtained in Sub-Saharan Africa are therefore likely to be small
and thus do not affect their amount of remittances sent.21 This has important implications for migrants’
origin countries: if substantial public and private investments in higher education are devoted to
individuals who work abroad in jobs that do not correspond to their educational qualifications, then the
potential gain from high-skilled emigration, in terms of higher remittances due to higher foreign
wages, is undermined by the waste of migrants’ human capital.
5. Conclusion
The so-called ‘brain-drain’ or the migration of high-skilled individuals to other regions where human
capital is abundant is a major concern for many developing countries, as it represents the loss of their
most talented workers. While remittances may offset some of the negative externalities of the brain
drain, there is also a concern that highly educated migrants may send less remittances to their
households at the origin country, suggesting that an increase in high-skill emigration will lower
remittance flows (for example, Adams, 2009; Faini, 2007; Niimi et al., 2010).
This paper investigates the relationship between migrants’ education and remittances using unique
microdata from five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to the few existing studies using
microdata, which are based on household surveys collected in migrants’ destination countries, the data
used in this study includes detailed information on both the migrants and the households at the origin
country. In addition, the data enables us to not only restrict our analysis to migrants in OECD
destination countries, but to further provide important insights into the remitting behaviour of internal
migrants and migrants in non-OECD destination countries, which have so far been neglected by the
existing literature.
Overall, we find that migrants with a university degree remit about 265–362 USD more to their
origin households than migrants without a university degree. This effect, however, is mainly driven by
the intensive margin: while migrants’ education does not affect the likelihood of sending remittances,
it has a sizable positive effect on the amount of remittances sent for those who are remitting. In our
preferred specification, migrants with a university degree remit around 31 per cent or 307 USD more
than migrants without a university degree. This positive effect of education on the amount of
remittances sent is robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. This contradicts the finding of previous
studies based on macrodata and suggests that some of the negative externalities of the brain drain on
origin countries can be counterbalanced by migrants’ remittances.
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When splitting the sample into migrants in OECD countries, migrants in non-OECD countries, and
internal migrants, the results remain robust at the extensive margin. For migrants in non-OECD
countries and internal migrants the results also remain robust at the intensive margin. For migrants
in OECD countries, however, the positive effect of migrants’ education on the amount of remittances
sent vanishes once characteristics of the household at the origin country are controlled for. This reveals
that part of the positive effect of migrants’ education on remittances is due to unobserved hetero-
geneity across origin households and thus highlights the importance of controlling for characteristics
of both sides of the migrant-household relationship when analysing migrants’ remittance behaviour.
Furthermore, this result supports previous findings of migrants’ educational downgrading in destina-
tion countries (see, for example, Mattoo, Neagu, & Özden, 2008). In OECD countries, migrants’
returns to having a university degree obtained in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be small, as they are
more likely to work in a lower skilled job, such that their educational qualification is uncorrelated with
the amount of remittances sent.
Although our results do not necessarily reflect causal effects, they provide important insights from a
policy perspective. In particular, two policy implications can be drawn from our analysis: first, high-
skilled migrants do not remit less than low-skilled migrants as emphasised by part of the existing
literature. In general, high-skilled migrants have higher earnings and fewer liquidity constraints than
low-skilled migrants and in turn send more remittances. This suggests that policies that favour skilled
migration are beneficial for the amount of remittances received by the origin country. The conclusion
of previous studies based on macrodata, that remittances will fall as the migrant skill level rises, is thus
not supported by our findings. Second, policy-makers should focus on implementing policies that
increase the probability of sending remittances for both high- and low-skilled migrants. One promising
measure to achieve this goal is to strengthen cooperation between origin and destination countries,
both in terms of information sharing about potential needs in the destination country’s labour market
as well as in terms of improving the recognition of foreign qualifications (Mattoo et al., 2008), which
will improve the economic situation of migrants in their destination country and therefore likely lead
to higher remittances flows to their countries of origin.
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Notes
1. Recent literature not only considers the negative consequences of high-skilled migration, but also points to its positive
effects, suggesting the existence of a brain gain instead of a brain drain (see, for example, Batista, Lacuesta, & Vicente,
2012; Beine, Docquier, & Oden-Defoort, 2011; Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2001; Clemens, 2011; Dustmann, Fadlon, &
Weiss, 2011).
2. Clemens and Pettersson (2008) and Bhargava, Docquier, and Moullan (2011) provide data on the emigration of profes-
sionals in the medical sector. Regional comparisons reveal that the medical brain drain is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa
(with average rates above 20% compared to 13% in South Asia and less than 10% in the other regions).
3. See Rapoport and Docquier (2006), Gibson and McKenzie (2011), Yang (2011), and Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for a
general literature overview and Azam and Gubert (2006) for a review on the remittance behaviour of African migrants.
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4. Notable exceptions include Osili (2007), using a matched sample of Nigerian migrants residing in Chicago and their origin
households, as well as Duval and Wolff (2010) and Bouoiyour and Miftah (2015), using household surveys from Albania
and Morocco, respectively. However, these studies are different from ours as they do not address the brain drain, but focus
on other aspects of migrants’ remittance behaviour.
5. Empirical evidence shows, for example, that remittances increase when the household left behind experiences a negative
income shock (see, for example, Yang & Choi, 2007; Gröger & Zylberberg, 2016; Bettin, Presbitero, & Spatafora, 2017;
Bettin & Zazzaro, 2017).
6. According to migration statistics provided by the World Bank (2013), only 27 per cent of Sub-Saharan African migrants go
to OECD countries, while the majority remain within the region (65%) or migrate to other non-OECD destination countries
(8%).
7. While international remittances have become a more frequently researched topic in recent years, studies on internal
remittances are almost non-existent. Notable exceptions are Regmi and Tisdell (2002) and De Brauw et al. (2013) analysing
the remittance motives of internal migrants in Nepal and Ethiopia, respectively and De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2016)
investigating, more generally, the risk sharing behaviour of internal migrants and their extended family network in Tanzania.
8. We check the robustness of our results to using alternative estimation methods, such as Tobit or Probit models (see Section
4.2).
9. The surveys are nationally representative for Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. In the case of Burkina Faso and Kenya, they are
representative for the 10 largest provinces and the top 17 districts with the highest concentration of migrants, respectively.
For further information about the data collection, see Plaza et al. (2011).
10. Note that we exclude five observations from the sample because the reported amount of yearly remittances was implausibly
high, exceeding 80,000 USD.
11. Using consumption expenditures as a measure of current and long-term household welfare is standard in the literature (see,
for example, Jena, 2017).
12. Descriptive statistics of all variables, separately for the samples of high- and low-skilled migrants, are shown in Table A1 in
the Appendix.
13. In our preferred specification (column V), migrants’ remittances peak at age 55 after having spent about 18 years in the
destination country.
14. The bequest motive suggests that migrants continually send remittances to the household left behind to strengthen the
relationship and thereby insure future bequests. Therefore, it predicts a positive correlation between the wealth of the origin
household and migrants’ probability to remit, but no strong relationship between the household’s wealth and the amount sent
by the migrants.
15. As occupational information is not available for all migrants in our sample, we refrain from using this variable in our
baseline regressions.
16. Due to the relatively small sample sizes, we refrain from estimating the regressions separately for each origin country.
17. Note that in the Probit model, the sample size is slightly reduced, because there exist a few districts in which no or all
migrants remit, which have to be excluded from the sample.
18. Note, however, that this finding may partly be due to the weak identification problem inherited in selection models without
exclusion restrictions. Note also that the Heckman model assumes that all non-remitters are unwilling to send money back
home. However, as Bettin, Lucchetti, & Zazzaro (2012) argue, in the presence of transfer costs and budget constraints, some
migrants might also be prevented from remitting. In such a case, the appropriate framework to model the remittance
decisions is a double-hurdle model, which features both censoring and selection mechanisms. However, as the censoring
point, that is, the minimum amount of remittances below which the costs of remitting are not offset by the additional utility
of remitting, is unknown, we refrain from utilising a double-hurdle model in our study.
19. The results for the overall effect are shown in Table B2 in the Supplementary Materials.
20. Information on the skill level of migrants’ jobs is obtained from self-reported information on migrants’ occupations in the
destination countries, which is only available for a sub-sample of all migrants in our sample.
21. In our sample, high-skilled migrants in OECD countries remit similar amounts as high-skilled migrants in non-OECD
countries (about 3000 USD per year), while low-skilled migrants remit more than three times the amount in OECD countries
than in non-OECD countries (2100 versus 600 USD per year).
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
All migrants
University
degree No degree
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Δ Mean
Migrant’s characteristics
Probability of remitting 0.553 0.497 0.551 0.498 0.553 0.497 −0.002
Total remittances (in 1,000 USD) 0.547 1.872 1.114 3.092 0.491 1.693 0.623†
Remittances, cond. on remitting (in 1,000 USD) 0.991 2.430 2.021 3.941 0.888 2.198 1.133†
University degree 0.091 0.288 - - - - -
Male 0.720 0.449 0.666 0.472 0.725 0.446 −0.059***
Age 34.944 9.582 34.685 9.606 34.970 9.580 −0.285
Married 0.661 0.473 0.605 0.489 0.667 0.471 −0.062***
Years since emigration 7.520 7.328 7.159 7.440 7.556 7.316 −0.397
Internal migrant 0.568 0.495 0.459 0.499 0.579 0.494 −0.120†
Migration reason
Education 0.132 0.338 0.264 0.441 0.118 0.323 0.145†
Work 0.687 0.464 0.605 0.489 0.696 0.460 −0.091†
Family 0.152 0.359 0.112 0.316 0.156 0.363 −0.044***
Other 0.029 0.168 0.019 0.136 0.030 0.170 −0.011
Labour force status
Full time employed 0.381 0.486 0.684 0.465 0.351 0.477 0.333†
Part time employed 0.066 0.249 0.077 0.267 0.065 0.247 0.012
Self employed 0.375 0.484 0.063 0.243 0.406 0.491 −0.343†
Not in labour force 0.178 0.382 0.176 0.381 0.178 0.382 −0.001
Relationship to head
Child 0.540 0.498 0.602 0.490 0.534 0.499 0.068†
Partner 0.079 0.269 0.118 0.323 0.075 0.263 0.043†
Sibling 0.245 0.430 0.173 0.379 0.253 0.435 −0.079†
Other relative 0.092 0.290 0.071 0.258 0.095 0.293 −0.023**
Destination country
High income 0.218 0.413 0.426 0.495 0.198 0.398 0.228†
Upper-middle income 0.024 0.153 0.039 0.195 0.022 0.148 0.017***
Lower-middle income 0.541 0.498 0.341 0.474 0.561 0.496 −0.220†
Low income 0.217 0.412 0.194 0.396 0.219 0.414 −0.025
Origin country
Burkina Faso 0.189 0.392 0.009 0.093 0.207 0.406 −0.199†
Kenya 0.191 0.393 0.431 0.496 0.167 0.373 0.264†
Nigeria 0.271 0.445 0.191 0.393 0.279 0.449 −0.088†
Senegal 0.222 0.416 0.120 0.325 0.233 0.422 −0.113†
Uganda 0.126 0.332 0.249 0.433 0.113 0.317 0.136†
Origin HH characteristicsa
Non-remittance income (in 1,000 USD) 5.239 15.122 12.917 29.982 4.470 12.457 8.447†
Urban 0.400 0.490 0.679 0.467 0.372 0.483 0.307†
Number of migrants 3.133 2.681 2.882 2.370 3.158 2.709 −0.276**
HH head=male 0.745 0.436 0.695 0.461 0.750 0.433 −0.055***
House is owned 0.835 0.371 0.743 0.437 0.845 0.362 −0.101†
Land is owned 0.706 0.456 0.548 0.498 0.721 0.448 −0.173†
Electricity 0.557 0.497 0.815 0.389 0.531 0.499 0.283†
HH size 7.716 5.545 5.144 3.801 7.973 5.626 −2.829†
Share of dependents 0.539 0.283 0.488 0.322 0.544 0.278 −0.056†
Observations 7,536 686 6,850
Notes: aThe descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the origin household are calculated at the migrant
level. The total amount of remittances is calculated based on all migrants, irrespective of whether they send
remittances or not. The last column shows the difference in mean values between migrants with a university
degree and migrants without a university degree. Significance stars indicate the result of the respective t-test.
†p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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